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Abstract 
Livestock products play a crucial role in the economy of Zimbabwe. It is a major source of 
foreign exchange earnings, employment, food, and farm income. Seventeen to thirty one percent 
of the total value of primary production in the large scale sector during the period 1965–82 was 
contributed by beef, cattle and dairy products. 
This paper has the following tasks: 
 Analysis of the price structure confronting beef producers and consumers. 
 Estimation of the quantitative response of producers and consumers to changes in the 
beef prices. 
Using the nominal protection index (which is the ratio of the domestic prices to border prices), it 
was shown that there is an increasing trend to subsidize beef producers during the period 1965 to 
1982. Pursuing the same quantitative basis of price comparisons, it was proven that beef 
consumers' subsidy declined during the period 1966 to 1981. Consumers were in fact taxed in 
1977 and 1978. A rationale for such policy bias can be attributed to the government's objectives 
of generating exportable beef surplus and to boost beef producers' income mainly at the expense 
of urban beef consumers. High-income urban consumers spend on the average seventy eight 
percent more than the lower urban income class on beef consumption. 
On the other hand, through the use of an aggregate demand model, it was empirically illustrated 
that a ten percent rise in beef retail prices will induce a decline in per capita beef consumption of 
4.8 to 5.19%. Also, fitted (finite price lag) cattle slaughter models gave an estimate of a 
producers' price response for the commercial and communal areas. Communal beef producers 
will cut the slaughter levels by 3.4% if producer prices are increased by 10%. For the same 
increase, commercial producers will also reduce slaughtering levels by 4.9 to 6.2% percent. Such 
behavior of both producers is consistent with economic theory since they have to maintain a 
bigger herd to enable them to take advantage of future price increase.  
  
Introduction 
The livestock sector has always played a pivotal role in the economy of Zimbabwe as a domestic 
food supplier, as a generator of export earnings or a major source of domestic farm income; and 
as an employer. Livestock products in the form of beef cattle and dairy accounted from 17 to 
31% of the total value of primary production in the large scale sector (Table 1) for the period 
1965–82. 
Table 1. The contribution of beef cattle and other major agricultural commodities to the total 
value of agricultural primary production in the large-scale sector (in percentages). 
Year Beef cattle Tobacco Maize Sugar Cotton Dairy 
produce 
Others 
1965 13 48 12 8 2 4 13 
1966 17 38 14 10 3 4 14 
1967 15 32 21 8 4 5 15 
1968 18 24 16 9 8 6 19 
1969 16 17 25 7 13 5 17 
1970 19 16 21 10 8 5 21 
1971 19 16 23 10 9 4 19 
1972 22 14 23 10 10 4 17 
1973 27 16 12 10 12 4 19 
1974 17 18 21 14 11 3 16 
1975 17 17 17 16 9 4 20 
1976 18 21 15 10 10 4 22 
1977 22 18 16 8 9 3 24 
1978 20 20 14 8 10 4 24 
1979 20 21 10 9 11 5 24 
1980 15 18 15 14 10 5 22 
1981 12 18 34 11 11 5 9 
1982 19 20 22 10 11 6 12 
Notes: Beef refers to cattle slaughtering only 
The drought years were 1968, 1970, 1973, and 1979 
Source: Central Statistical Office. 
Livestock products are produced on three types of livestock enterprises, i.e. large- and small-
scale commercial farms and communal areas' peasant holdings. A large-scale unit satisfies at 
least one of the following criteria:- 
 5 or more permanent employees 
 25 or more hectares under crops (all crops)  
 350 or more livestock (cattle sheep, and pigs) 
Both large- and small-scale units are characterized by modern farm technologies. On the other 
hand, communal areas' peasant holdings will be characterized by a lower form of technology and 
a higher home-consumption levels of the farm products. Labour in such places will in majority of 
cases be supplied by family members. 
The government's participation in the beef sector started in the late twenties. In 1927, confronted 
with a surplus of cattle in the domestic market, the government entered into air export agreement 
with the Imperial Cold Storage of Cape Town. The export contract was between the latter and 
the Rhodesian Cold Storage and Supply Ltd. which was then owned by a private group. The 
agreement provided a subsidy to the Rhodesia Cold Storage and the provision of a pre-emptive 
right to the government to expropriate the former after ten years. 
In 1937, the government assumed the management and ownership of the Cold Storage 
Commission. The Commission have factories in Harare (established in 1943), Umtali (1946), 
Fort Victoria (1951), Gatooma (1970), Marandellas (1975), Sinoia (1976), and small cold stores 
at Que Que (1946) and Gwelo (1947). In 1976, a major cold store complex was built in Gwelo. 
In 1967, the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) was placed under the authority of the Agricultural 
Marketing Authority (AMA). The AMA is the agency which conducts the initial hearings with 
the farmers' associations in the process of gazetting producer prices. The CSC is considered by 
the government as the institution which will permit it to accomplish the following objectives:- 
 To attain self-sufficiency in beef products. 
 To achieve an exportable surplus of beef. 
As such, the operating policy of CSC is to support producers' prices on the basis of the cost of 
production incurred within alternative commercial farming systems. The cost data are partly 
furnished by the Commercial Farmers' Union and partly by the extension service unit of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Both sources rely on the use of case studies of particular farming units 
to generate their cost of production statistics. The GSC's trading activities are financed heavily 
by government advances and loans. 
This paper aims to accomplish the following: 
 To depict the price structure, resulting from government interventions, confronting beef 
producers and consumers. 
 To attempt to estimate the quantitative response of producers and consumers to changes 
in the beef prices. 
The first section describes the production structure of the beef sector. The second provides the 
trend in beef consumption and initial estimates on an aggregate beef demand. The third part 
gives the producers' price structure (vis-à-vis world prices), aggregate supply response 
parameter, and discussions on the beef-grading scheme and on its implications for beef produces 
in communal areas.  
Note: Significant comments on this paper have been provided by S. Sandford  
  
The structure of production 
The number of cattle on large farms had an increasing compounded annual growth rate till 1977 
as evidenced by:  
Period Annual growth rate 
1920–30 1.5% 
1945–55 2.2% 
1955–65 2.7% 
1965–77 5.0% 
1977–81 –7.2% 
The decline in the period after 1977 can be attributed to the effect of drought in 1979 and the 
internal security situation. The communal areas' herd, on the other hand, grew by 5.2% annually 
in the period 1965–77. It also showed a decline of 4% per year between 1977 and 1981.  
For the period 1966—1983 as a whole, the beef herd in the large-scale sector rose by 1.5% per 
annum. A large part of this increase can be attributed to the growth of the average farm herd size 
of 3.62% per year (from 358 to 655) while the number of beef farms declined by 2.01% per year 
(from 4379 to 3070). The bulk of the beef herd of the large-scale sector is situated in the 
Matabeleland, Mashonaland (North and South), and Midlands areas. For example, in 1983, these 
areas accounted for 86% of the total stock.  
In terms of changes in the herd structure of the large scale sector for the period 1965–83, the 
trends were as follows:- 
Type 
Annual growth rate of number of 
animals 
Calves 3% 
Breeding 
females  
1.5% 
Other females 2.3% 
Bulls 2.6% 
Other males .2% 
There was a pronounced decline in the breeding female component from 1,028,000 heads in 
1976 to 733,000 heads in 1980.  
The average slaughter offtake rate for the large-scale sector for the period I964/65 to 1982/83 
was 14% (with a standard deviation of 4%). In the case of the small-scale farms, offtake rates 
ranged between 10 and 15% during the period 1974–78. The average death rate (large scale) was 
3% for the same period. The average calving rate (large scale) was 58% with standard deviation 
of 6%) for the period 1965–83. Magnitudes of calving rate are affected partly by the stocking 
rate as indicated by experimental results obtained at the Matopose Research Station for a fixed 
area of 1044 hectares:  
  
Light Stocking 
(ILU/HA) 
Heavy Stocking 
(8LU/HA) 
Calving 
percentage 
69 53 
A substantial portion of the mature cattle slaughterings is undertaken at the Cold Storage 
Commission (Table 4). In 1983, the CSC accounted for 87% of the total. For the period 1965-83, 
the CSC's share averaged 82% (±standard deviation of 5%).  
Except in the communal areas (where CSC purchase cattle on a live-mass basis), the CSC since 
its inception has always adopted a carcass oriented buying policy. In general, it is known that 
pricing cattle on the basis of carcass and grade has the following advantages:  
 It enables the pursuance of a pricing policy based on the characteristics of an animal. As 
such, the consumer (both domestic and foreign) is assured of a wide array of easily 
identifiable food products with varying qualities.  
 It eliminates marketing costs arising from any asymmetry in the information regarding 
the animal being sold that is available to the producer and marketing agents respectively. 
The three ingredients necessary for a carcass grading scheme are accuracy, objectivity, and 
feasibility. On July 1, 1977, in order to assure the proper payment for a particular cattle quality 
and to eliminate a high degree of arbitrariness on the part of the graders, carcasses were grouped 
according to age, flesh development (based on length to mass ratios) and fat cover. 
Corresponding prices were paid for the various quality combinations. Data on the cattle 
slaughtered according to the age attributes considered in the pricing scheme are provided in 
Table 5. A contraction in almost all the female class slaughtering has occurred from 1978 to 
1981. Part of the reason for the contraction is the constant revision of prices paid to the 
producers. For example:  
1. In January 1, 1979, the basic beef price was raised by 12½% and a 5% premium was 
incorporated in all price schedules. In addition, the pricing scheme introduced separate 
prices for 0–2 tooth and 4–6 tooth animals.  
2. In May 1979, it was decreed that producer prices were to be increased by an additional 
10% retrospective to the January 1, 1979 pronouncement.  
3. Producer prices were further increased by 15% on January 1, 1980.  
4. In 1981, the government increased beef cattle prices by 30% with retrospective effect to 
March 2, 1981.  
5. For the period 1982–83, the average beef producer price was again increased by 22%.  
  
Beef consumption pattern and the factors affecting it 
Export sales (as a proportion of total beef sales) ranged from 44% to 68% during the period 
1965–79. In terms of the total value of meat products exported during the period 1970–81, beef 
(in frozen and canned forms) contributed 50 to 93% of the total. Most of the exports were 
destined for South Africa prior to 1978. By 1980, beef exports manifested a sharp decline. The 
unstable peace and order conditions in the previous years (1977–79) led to the deterioration of 
veterinary services and destruction of dipping facilities. These factors resulted in a significant 
drop in the domestic availability of beef and deterioration of beef quality suitable for export 
demand. In fact, a beef rationing scheme was pursued in the domestic market during the period 
1979 to 1981. 
Beef consumption on the domestic scene has grown from 48,050 tons in 1965 to 111, 300 tons in 
1983. This represented an annual growth of 7%. Beef represented 70% of total meat 
consumption in 1983. The possible substitutes for beef, such as pig and poultry meat, grew 
annually by 3% and 9% respectively in the period 1970–82. Although poultry meat had a higher 
growth than beef (7%), its share in meat consumption is quite low. For example in 1983, its share 
was only 10%. 
During the period, 1976/77 to 1981/82, budgetary "subsidies" for beef were (quoted by Jansen 
(1982)): 
Year 
Beef subsidy (Zimbabwe  
$ (000)) 
Total subsidy 
(Zimbabwe $ (000)) 
1976/77 6338 958 
1977/78 11265 14483 
1978/79 20516 42173 
1979/80 12920 26302 
1980/81 9619 50568 
1981/82 25730 121650 
A subsidy scheme is usually pursued either to stimulate an exportable surplus or to encourage the 
domestic consumption of the commodity (for say nutritional reasons such as obtaining protein 
from beef). To examine the consumption aspects of the beef subsidy scheme, the domestic retail 
price for beef was compared with its border price. If the domestic retail price is above (below) 
the border price consumers face implicit taxes (subsidies) whenever they purchase beef. Table 6 
shows that the domestic retail price for beef has been increasingly aligned with the equivalent 
border price. This is shown more clearly by the following averages: 
 
 
Period 
Average domestic retail border rice  
ratio for beef 
1966–69 .72 
1970–72 .95 
1973–75 .75 
1976–81 1.16 
In fact in 1977 and 1978, the consumer was taxed rather than subsidized. 
Nevertheless, despite the insight provided by Table 6 on the domestic consumer beef price 
policy, use of the various price ratios cited must be treated with caution. Firstly, the degree of 
under- or over-valuation of the exchange rate has not been considered. To the extent that there is 
an over-valuation of the exchange rate, then the estimated ratio can be over-stated. Secondly, the 
marketing margin (35%) utilized in adjusting the border price to the equivalent domestic 
marketing level is largely dominated by the CSC operations which may include either some 
monopoly profits or additional casts arising from potential marketing inefficiencies. 
Table 6. Comparison of domestic retail price of beef with border price (1966–81 all prices in 
cents/kg). 
Year 
Domestic beef retail 
price* Border price equivalent** 
Ratio of domestic to 
border price 
1966 33.20 49.95 .67 
1967 35.52 48.60 .72 
1968 38.00 52.65 .72 
1969 40.67 52.65 .77 
1970 43.51 48.60 .90 
1971 46.56 47.25 .99 
1972 49.82 51.30 .97 
1973 53.31 64.80 .82 
2974 57.04 89.10 .64 
1975 61.03 76.95 .79 
1976 65.30 64.80 1.00 
1977 69.88 54.00 1.29 
1978 74.77 51.30 1.46 
1979 80.00 75.60 1.06 
1980 86.00 78.30 1.10 
1981 114 00 110.20 1.03 
* The domestic beef retail price series was contracted by assuming an annual 7% growth rate in 
retail prices. The latter growth rate represented the trend for the wholesale beef prices for the 
period 1970–81. It was assured that the same trend persisted for retail prices for the above 
period. 
** The export realized price was adjusted by 35% which represented the marketing margin. 
Jansen (1982) utilized the same margin for previous work. 
An aggregate beef demand was estimated for the period 1970–83. In linear and log form, the 
demand relationships are respectively: 
  
 
  
Where qbt is the beef per capita consumption in period t. 
Pbt is the real retail beef price in period t. 
drt is a dummy variable equal to 1 in the presence of a rationing scheme and O otherwise. 
Variables with primes represent log transformation to the base e. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
The fit obtained for the two demand equations is not satisfactory. However, the price coefficients 
are statistically significant (as evidenced by its value being approximately equal to 2) and have 
the correct signs. Furthermore, serial correlation problems were not encountered (i.e. the Durbin 
Watson (DV) values are reasonable). 
The demand price elasticities obtained ranged from –.48 to –.51 (computed at the means). Rather 
than focus on the level of significance of the elasticity coefficients (which can be easily 
undertaken for 3.2), we opted to compare the confidence intervals of the elasticity parameters 
generated by (3.1) and (3.2). This side steps the appropriateness of using the null hypothesis that 
the price elasticity or regression coefficient equals zero which is commonly pursued in most 
regression softwares in undertaking a test of the level of significance. In the case of (3.1), the 
confidence interval of the elasticity coefficient involves obtaining the roots of the following 
expression: 
 Where g is the confidence coefficient 
kl is the product of the regression coefficient (b l and the mean price (Pb) 
k2 is the mean quantity 
R is the ratio between the expected values of kl and k2 respectively and t is the usual student 
value. 
The respective confidence intervals at g =.95 of the price elasticity coefficient (in absolute terms) 
.for (3.1) and (3.2) are: 
1. .35 <.51 < .72 
2. .36 <.48 < 1.33 
Ideally, the "best" confidence interval is the one endowed with minimum expected length. It is 
clear that the elasticity estimate of the log form is inferior as compared to the elasticity 
coefficient estimated at the means for the linear demand equation if the confidence interval 
criteria are invoked. 
In terms of substitutes for beef, the terms of trade (ratio of the retail price of substitute to the 
retail price of beef) seem to be in favour of beef with respect to consumption. The empirical 
evidence partly supporting such a hypothesis is the terms of trade for meat products in Harare: 
Year Mutton/Beef Pork/Beef Chicken/Beef 
1973 2.06 1.80 1.46 
1974 2.05 1.70 1.43 
1975 1.94 1.64 1.39 
1976 2.75 1.76 1.30 
1977 2.59 1.67 1 29 
1978 2.43 1.58 . 1.47 
1979 2.29 1.73 1.40 
1980 2.55 1:82 1.60 
It is to be noted that mutton prices at the retail level are not controlled by the government. A 
favourable terms of trade for the beef sector will dampen any expansion of demand of meat 
substitutes such as mutton, pork, and chicken. It is difficult to assess whether the government's 
policy is to preserve a large share of the domestic meat market for the beef producers. 
Nevertheless, part of the reason for the higher prices of pork and chicken relative to beef can be 
their higher feed and other input costs.  
  
Pricing policy towards beef producers 
An index which can be used to monitor the ex-post impact of a given price policy is the nominal 
protection coefficient (NPC): 
(4.1) NPC = Pd/Pw 
where Pd is the domestic producer price in period t 
Pw is the border price in period t 
In the case of beef, the border price (Pw) is defined as: 
(4.2) Pw=  π Px – M + R   
where π is the exchange rate 
P is the border price in foreign denomination per kg 
M is the marketing margin 
R is the revenue of relevant cattle by-products.  
If NPC is greater or less than one, then the producer is either subsidized or taxed respectively. 
The NPC for beef for the period 1965–82 is given in Table 7. The NPC was estimated under 
various assumptions pertaining to the marketing margins (incurred by CSC) and the revenue 
contributions of offals and hides as follows: 
   
Marketing margin 
Revenue contribution of offals and 
hides 
NPC1 40% 25% 
NPC2 30% 25% 
NPC3 30% 30% 
NPC4 30% 35% 
Table 7. Nominal protection rates confronting domestic beef producers (1965–82). 
Year NPC1 NPC2 NPC3 NPC4 
1965 1.020 .874 .816 .757 
1966 1.148 .984 .919 .853 
1967 1.232 1.060 .986 .915 
1968 1.160 1.000 .929 .862 
1969 1.152 .991 .922 .845 
1970 1.242 1.068 .993 .917 
1971 1.313 1.129 1.050 .967 
1972 1.328 1.143 1.063 .985 
1973 1.271 1.093 1.017 .939 
1974 1.076 .926 .861 .800 
1975 1.293 1.112 1.034 .966 
1976 1.484 1.277 1.188 1.096 
1977 1.810 1.557 1.488 1.347 
1978 1.882 1.552 1.505 1.395 
1979 1.573 1.353 1.258 1.174 
1980 1.748 1.504 1.398 1.330 
1981 1.556 1.339 1.245 1.160 
1982 1.755 1.510 1.404 1.305 
Note: For explanation of NPC1 – NPC4 see text. 
The main rationale in estimating alternative values for NPC was to see how sensitive the ratio is 
to possible changes in the latter elements. Nevertheless, a single trend which emerges is the 
growing subsidy provided to domestic producers during the period 1965–82. The average 
nominal protection coefficients (together with their standard deviations) in particular sub-periods 
tend to support each hypothesis: 
   1965–69 1970–74 1975–82 
NPC1 1.14 (.08) 1.25 (.10) 1.64 (.20) 
NPC2 .98 (.06) 1.07 (.09) 1.40 (.16) 
NPC3 .91 (.06) 1.00 (.08) 1.32 (.16) 
NPC4 .85 (.06) .92 (.07) 1.22 (.15) 
If subsidies on beef consumption are correctly estimated to be on the decline, then this represents 
an attempt by the government to boost rural incomes (mostly commercial farmers) at the expense 
of urban consumers. Comparison of the various mean ratios also indicates: 
 Overstating the marketing margin by 25% causes the ratio to be higher by 17 %. 
 Overstating the revenue contribution of the by-products to the tune of 17% lends to an 
understatement of the ratio by 8% 
An alternative way to look into the pricing policy of the government with respect to livestock 
producers is to consider the following relationship: 
(4.3) Pd = a + b Pw 
Pd is the expected producer price in period t 
Pw is the expected world price in period t  
if b = 0, this means that the government has completely insulated livestock producers' prices 
from the international market price movements. A possible reason for the government to 
undertake such strategy is to prevent the transmission of international market fluctuations into 
the domestic market in the short run. It is further noted that as b approaches zero, substantial 
variation in the nominal protection coefficient will occur.1 This simply means that variations in 
government policies will be large if a price insulation policy is pursued. 
 
The empirical estimate of (4.3) is: 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors  
Period of fit was 1965–82  
Pd and Pw are in cents per kg of beef (bone in) of average quality 
The magnitudes of the coefficients of (4.4) (b ≠ 0) indicate that the government permits the 
domestic beef producers' price to be responsive to changes in international market conditions. 
As mentioned previously, to effect the appropriate payments for the beef sold to the CSC a 
carcass grading scheme has been pursued. However, despite the apparent objectivity in the 
1981–82 price schedule, some grey areas still existed under the former arrangements. Van Vliet 
(1982), using the 1981/82 price schedule, illustrated that the price difference between two similar 
carcasses can be as high as 44%. As a result the flesh class component of the pricing (1981/82) 
schedule was further subdivided into very finite intervals to minimize ambiguity with respect to 
such quality (Tables 8–9). Also, there was a shift in the product quality weights (with respect to 
the carcass pricing policy) from age to the flesh class component in the 1981/82 to 1982/83 
schedules. 
Table 8. Beef producer prices (Zimbabwe cents per kg: of cold dressed mass) (mid-month 
prices). 
Age class  Fleshing class Fat class 
1981/82 0–2T  4–6T FM FA A B C D E 1 2 3 9 
Mar 97 96 85 79 15 12 8 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Apr 93 92 82 77 13 10 5 –4  –7 8 5 –3 –6 
May 93 92 82 77 13 10 5 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Jun 95 93. 85 81 14 11 7 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
July* 97 94 87 82 14 11 7 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Aug* 97 95 88 82 14 11. 8 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Sept*    9795 88 82 15 13 8 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Oct* 98 96 89 83 15 13 8 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Nov* 100 98 91 85 17 15 8 –4 –7 8. 5 –3 –6 
Dec* 102 101 92 86 18 18 9 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Jan* 102 101 91 86 21 19 10 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
Feb* 101 100 90 84 19 16 9 –4 –7 8 5 –3 –6 
*Incentive Prices: Incentive prices apply to the following classifications 0 – 6-tooth: Al, A2, BI 
and B2 only and in the given month as follows: July 5c/kg; August 15c.kg; and September to 
February 17c/kg. 
Bull Beef : Carcasses of young bulls ( BY ) are paid for as detailed in the Schedule while 
carcasses of other bulls (BU) are subject to a discount of 16c/kg c.d.m. 
Inferior Class: Any carcasses classed as inferior does not enter the classification scheme and 
receives a price of 52c/kg. 
Table 9. Beef producer prices (Zimbabwe cents per kg. of cold dressed mass) (mid-month 
prices). 
Age class Fleshing class Fat class 
1982/83  0 2 4 6 FM  FA A+  A– B+  B–  C+  C– D+   D–  E+  E– 1 2  3  9  
Mar 43  43  43  38  34  27  60 52 45 38 30 23 16 10 6 3 0  0  –8  –8 
Apr " " " " " " 47 40 33 28 23 19 14 6 4 2 " " " " 
May " " " " " " 41 36 31 26 22 17 12 6 4 2 " " " " 
June " " " " " " 45 39 33 29 24 18 12 8 5 2 " " " " 
July " " " " " " 50 44 36 32 27 21 14 8 5 2 " " " " 
Aug " " " " " " 57 49 42 36 29 2.3 15 9 5 3 " " " " 
Sept " " " " " " 61 53 45 39 32 24 16 10 6 3 " " " " 
Oct " " " " " " 67 58 49 41 34 25 17 11 6 3 " " " " 
Nov " " " " " " 73 64 54 45 36 27 20 13 7 3 " " " " 
Dec " " " " " " 80 70 60 50 40 30 22 14 8 4 " " " " 
Jan " " " " " " 80 70 60 50 40 30 22 14 8 4 " " " " 
Feb " " " " " " 80 70 60 50 40 30 22 14 8 4 " " " " 
Notes: 
Bull Beef: Carcasses of young bulls (BY) will be paid for as detailed in the schedule, and will 
not be subject to any discount. Carcasses of all other bulls (BU) will receive a price equal to the 
ruling price for FA category less 19c/kg. Penalties and premiums for fat cover and fleshing will 
apply. 
Inferior Class: Any carcass classed as inferior will not enter the classification scheme, and will 
receive the inferior grade price of 63c/kg. 
Source: Cold Storage Commission. 
In the 1984/85 price schedule, an additional provision for a primary component (residual quality 
adjustment) was provided. For example, the producer price is computed as follows: 
a. Primary price is 80 cents per kg during the whole period. 
b. Age price according to: 
Age class (teeth) Cents per kg. 
0 44 
2 44 
4 44 
6 40 
Full mouth 30 
  c.    Fleshing prices varying by month and by class. 
Although the main purpose of the carcass grading scheme is to transmit price signals with 
respect to the cattle mix which commercial produces intend to sell, the said price policy 
instrument may need to be supplemented with equity-oriented tools. For example, the 
distribution of inputs, fixed farm assets, and technological knowledge will likely be in favor of 
the commercial producers as compared to the communal ones. As a result, the incidence of the 
benefits of a pricing policy will be biased towards the commercial farms. 
Slaughter price response models were fitted for the period, 1965–82. In terms of R2 and 
statistical significance of regression coefficients, the finite lag expectation approach outperforms 
the infinite one. These lag structures are defined as follows: 
Type of Lag Weighting scheme with respect to lag variables 
Fisher (arithmetic 
lag) 
 
Almon Lag 
 
In the case of the Almon lag, an end-point constraint teas imposed, i.e. ak = 0. As a result of this 
constraint (given k = 3), the two almon price-transformed independent variables are: 
  is the price 
variable). Note that the end-point constraint is imposed to set a terminal point for the impact of 
the independent price variables: 
The empirical estimates of the Fisher and almon lag models are: 
 
 
Where St is the slaughter level (in thousand heads) 
(Pt is the weighted average producer price in Zimbabwe cents per kg. of 
carcass weight across classes in period t) 
 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
 t is the time variable 
DW is the Durbin Watson estimated value 
n is the number of observations. 
The models fit the data moderately well (as indicated by the R2). There is also no serious 
autocorrelation encountered (as supported by the DW values). Nevertheless, the standard errors 
of the price coefficients, particularly for (4.5), is relatively large. This indicates the possible 
existence of severe multicollinearity among the transformed independent variables. A 
measurement of the degree of multicollinearity is the eigenvalues corresponding to the 
independent variable vectors. The rationale for such criterion follows from the symmetry of the 
product matrix of the independent variables, i.e. X'X (where X is a Txk matrix of the 
independent variables). Since X'X is symmetric, we can always convert it into a diagonal matrix 
by pre- and post-multiplying it by C (where C is an orthogonal matrix). The resulting' matrix 
(obtained from C'X'XC) is = diag (λ, ..:, λn). λ1, ..., λn, the diagonal elements, are the eigenvalues 
corresponding to C'X'XC. It is clear that the inverse of C'X'XC is simply the inverse of the 
diagonal elements of λ. Hence λ will be difficult to invert, if λ1 is close to zero. As an operational 
rule of thumb, an eigenvalue between .1 and .3 indicates moderate multicollinearity while an 
eigenvalue less than .1 indicates a high multicollinearity. The eigenvalues corresponding to C' 
(Vt Y Vt ,t)' (Vt , Vt ,t)C are 2.87, .0004, and .1268. To minimize the degree of multicollinearity 
arid to preserve consistency with the theoretical structure of the lag models, ridge regression was 
utilized to re-estimate the models. The ridge approach basically involves adding a scalar, k, to 
the elements of λ . The optimal k is obtained usually by minimizing the mean square error. 
Details of the ridge methodology are given in Rodriguez (1984). Ridge regression normally 
yields biased regression coefficients but efficient estimators. An estimate of the Almon 
relationship at the optimal ridge parameter, k = .0001, is: 
 
At k= .001, the sum of the variance inflation factor (the ith variance inflation factor of the jth 
regressor is the ith diagonal element of the correlation matrix) is 1413.56 as compared to 
2508.22 (when k = 0) for the Almon relationship. Substantial reduction has been achieved with 
respect to the impact of multicollinearity. 
In the short run, the price elasticity obtained through the use of an expected producer price 
equals to twice the expected value of Pt and the coefficient of   is –.59. In the case of (4.6), re-
expressing it in terms of the price variables, we get: 
(4.8) St = 636.72 – 7.95 Pt + .88 Pt – 1 + 3.53 Pt – 2 
The elasticity expression of (4.8) for the period t-2 to t calculated at the means of St and Pt is: 
 
The elasticity estimated is –.49 (as derived from (4.8) and (4.9). Pursuing the same steps, the 
ridge regression (Almon model) yield a short-run price elasticity of –61 to –63. In terms of sign, 
the elasticity parameters obtained are consistent with economic theory. Producers will hold back 
animals from slaughter because they need a larger herd to obtain higher slaughter offtake levels 
if they anticipate prices to increase. The absolute magnitudes of the elasticities are comparable 
with those obtained elsewhere such as in Brazil (–.113 to –.575); Argentina (–.668 to –.962); and 
Columbia (–.058 to –1.20). 
The previous supply elasticity estimates largely reflect the behavior of commercial livestock 
producers to price changes. Hence, to determine the direction magnitude of the price response of 
livestock producers in the communal areas, a supply relationship defined below was fitted to the 
period 1965–1983 (Appendix Table 2); 
 
All (dependent and independent) variables except D and W are in logarithm (base e). 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
Sct is the total number of heads sold at official auctions in the communal farming areas in period 
t. 
D is a binary variable (representing the presence of drought conditions). 
It is equal to one for the years 1968, 1970, 1979, 1982 and 1983. 
W is a binary variable (representing the internal security situation). 
It is equal to 1 for the years 1978 and 1979 and zero otherwise. 
The model (4.9) is the empirical estimate of the reduced form of the Koyck lag model. Such 
framework assumes that the weights attached by communal farmers on prices decline 
geometrically as the price information gets "older". 
The sign of the price coefficient coincides with previous estimates. Doran, Low, and Kemp 
(1979) argue that a priori, it should be negative since livestock producers in communal areas will 
sell fewer higher priced animals to meet their cash requirements. However, in absolute terms the 
magnitude of the short-run supply elasticity (.34) is less than those calculated for the commercial 
livestock sector, but statistically significant at the 10 level. 
Previous short-run cattle slaughter price elasticities are –1.05 DLK (Doran, Low, and Kemp 
(1979)) for Swaziland and 1.10 to 1.15 KS (Khalifa and Simpson (1972)) for Sudan. The period 
of fit for the first parameter was 1950–76 while it was 1919–35 and 1946–65 for the second 
parameter. The DLK figure was estimated at the means while that of KS was derived from a 
logarithmic form. 
A common conceptual difficulty encountered in both the DLK and KS models arose from the 
definition of the dependent (endogenous) variable. Doran defined it as: 
(i) TS + (EXP-IMP) – 14% POLC × 100 
SNLC 
Where TS = total slaughterings 
EXP = number exported for slaughter 
IMP = number imported for slaughter 
POLC = privately owned land cattle 
SNLC = Swazi nation land cattle.  
Fourteen percent is the offtake rate in privately owned lands and assumed to be insensitive to 
price changes. To the extent that such assumption is not true, then the response of TS and EXP to 
price changes will include those of the commercial producers in privately owned lands (which is 
expected to be high). This may partly explain the high absolute magnitude of the Doran elasticity 
estimate. 
On the other hand, Low (1975) noted that the dependent variable in Khalifa and Simpson model 
may reflect only the slaughter of animals in a "premium priced and demand determined market". 
He contends that once producers sell in a premium market A, they will sell less in market B 
(where they get lower prices per animal unit as compared to market A) provided they have 
already met their minimum cash income targets. The price differentials existing between markets 
A and B mean that given a price increase in market A, the increased sales in market A will be 
less than the reduction in sales in market B. The overall response then to an increase in the price 
will be negative. 
The cattle sold at official auctions in the communal areas largely purchased by the CSC who 
accounted, on the average, for 65% of total sales (with a standard deviation of ± 12%). Such 
policy reflects partly the objective of CSC to effect a guaranteed producer price for the livestock 
products of communal farmers. During periods of drought, a substantial portion of the CSC 
purchase is in the form of young cattle stocks. For example in 1870, close to 32% of total CSC 
market acquisition belongs to the latter. The young stocks are usually placed on grazier 
agreements with other farmers or held in the CSC cattle pens. By minimizing the drastic effect of 
drought on the cattle herd, the CSC is in effect trying to stabilize the availability of beet to the 
domestic market and to preserve export capabilities. 
Some of the implications arising from the nature of our elasticity estimates are: 
a. In the short-run, an increase in the price received by domestic producers will result in 
lower levels of slaughterings. Coupled with rising beef demand, this will result in a lower 
exportable surplus which might affect the foreign exchange contribution of the beef 
sector. 
b. Since the earlier price transmission relationship indicates that the government do not 
insulate the domestic market from international price changes, then international cattle 
cycles can be experienced by domestic beef producers. This means that in periods of high 
international prices, the number of domestic animals slaughtered by producers can 
decline resulting in lower exports. 
c. A higher producer price will induce an increase in cattle inventories. An increase in the 
cattle inventories will require an increase in the usage of domestic resources such as land, 
labor, coarse grains, etc. If the increase in the livestock activity reduces resources in crop 
activities wherein Zimbabwe enjoys a comparative advantage, then the producer price 
increase will incur an efficiency cost. On the other hand, if the increase in livestock 
inventories induces the consumption of, say, grain by-products which have zero 
opportunity costs, then some indirect benefits are realized. 
  
Conclusion 
The Beef sector contributes, on the average, about 22% of the total output originating from the 
primary sector. It is also an export earner for the Zimbabwe economy. Cattle productivity among 
commercial farmers seems to be satisfactory with average slaughter offtake rates of 14% and an 
average annual growth rate for the breeding female animals of 1.5% for the period 1965–83. 
Productivity in the communal areas will likely be lower. 
Current trends in the government's pricing policy indicate more towards declining subsidies on 
beef consumption and a higher nominal protection rates accorded to beef producers. The implicit 
objective then behind such move might be to boost the farm income (mostly of commercial 
farmers) at the expense of high-income urban consumers. The latter spends on the average 78% 
more than the lower urban income class on beef consumption. Initial estimates indicate that both 
commercial farmers and communal areas' peasant producers respond to changes in producer 
prices in the same way as producers in other countries.  
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Appendices 
Table 1.  Demand data used in beef regression runs (1970–83) 
Year 
Per capita beef 
consumption ( in 
kgs) 
Deflated retail beef price 
(cents/kg ) 
Dummy variable for 
rationing 
1970 9.74 39.14 0 
1971 9.77 37.59 0 
1972 11.03 37.47 0 
1973 11.53 37.41 0 
1974 10.94 38.08 1 
1975 10.90 37.53 0 
1976 11.45 36.11 0 
1977 11.78 33.55 0 
1978 11.98 32.17 0 
1979 11.75 34.38 1 
1980 12.43 32.03 1 
1981 11.25 28.16 1 
1982 12.43 29.67 0 
1983 13.74 35.46 0 
Source of Basic Data: Cold Storage Commission. 
Table 2. Cattle sales at official auctions in the communal farming areas 
Calendar year 
Total cattle sold  
(number of head) 
Average price on live mass 
basis  
(c/kg and in Zimbabwe $) 
1965 130488 10.51 
1966 95448 12.09 
1967 67469 13.40 
1968 87089 12.62 
1969 85060 13.16 
1970 101961 12.55 
1971 90915 12.35 
1972 68324 14.22 
1973 97025 14.93 
1974 108261 19.73 
1975 79532 22.71 
1976 67641 20.61 
1977 48196 20.39 
1978 23899 19.88 
1979 21615 22.29 
1980 42910 27.35 
1981 58576 35.23 
1982 76690 40.70 
1983 77142 43.54 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (Communal Cattle Marketing Section). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
